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MR. SMITH WENT TO WASHINGTON AND
NEVER CAME HOME: A DEFENSE OF
COLORADO'S TERM LIMITATION
AMENDMENT*
Jennifer A. Covell, Brian M. Mittman, David Olarsch & Deirdre Pierson"

I. INTRODUCTION
Public support for long-term Congressional incumbency
eroded rapidly during the Bush Presidency. By Novemtwr, 1992,
popular referenda in fifteen states imposed some form of term
limitation on national representatives.' Alternatively characterized
as inherently undemocratic or a as means to ensure representative
democracy, the validity of term limitations has not yet been
reviewed by the courts. 2
In light of an incumbency return rate
to Congress of more than ninety percent, term limitations have
been compared to "a primal scream of sorts by citizens attempting
to retake control of their government."3 Opponents of term
"Contributors: Andrew Moss, Brooklyn Law School ("BLS') Class of 1994
& David D. Kim, BLS Class of 1993. Prepared for publication by Yuval D.
Bar-kokhba & Anne Bracken, BLS Class of 1994. The authors wish to thank
BLS Professor Jeffrey Stempel who assisted in the preparation of this article.
BLS Class of 1994.
'Don J. DeBenedictis, Voters Limit Politicians' Terms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993
at 26. ("DeBenedictis ' ) In addition to the Colorado Amendment, in 1992, 20
million people in 14 states voted to impose limitations on the number of
consecutive terms their federal congressional representatives and senators may
serve. Id. The fourteen states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington and Wyoming. Susan B. Glasser, After Their Impressive
Victories in 14 States, Term-Limit Backers PlanNext Steps on Hill, ROLL CALL,
Jan. 18, 1993.
2
The main reason courts have not considered term limits is that "most termlimit initiatives will not prevent incumbents from running until the 1998
elections." Don J. DeBenedictis, supra note 1, at 26.
'Rob Mosbacher & Jim Calaway, Basic Change in System Begins with Term
Limits, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 2, 1993, at 13. Furthermore, "it is an effort to take
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limitations argue that election reforms, (e.g., public campaign
financing, restrictions on lobbyists, etc.) rather than term
limitations, provide a better means to transform Congressional
careers into seats of public service. Public sentiment, however,
clearly appears to favor term limits. The 1992 term limitation
initiatives garnered "more votes than [presidential candidate] Ross
Perot, and a greater percentage of the vote in all 14 battleground
states than President Clinton." 4 These results attest to the
underlying desire for change in the nation's current political
structure. Politicians and constituents agree that "what is required
is a fundamental change in the attitude of those serving elective
office." ' Political commentator George F. Will, a proponent of
term limitations, believes that such action is the way to:
change the motives that impel people to come to
public life. You will rule out one ruinous motive,
the motive of having a long-term career. You will
not get people who come into politics from no
career and have no career to go back to, for whom,
therefore, defeat is oblivion.6

This article explores the constitutionality of Colorado's
1991 Amendment to its State Constitution which imposes term

their government back from special interest political action committees and
lobbyists, and the career politicians with whom they have developed an unholy

alliance to perpetuate the status quo. Simply put, it represents an attempt to recreate elective office as a public service rather than a lifetime career." Id.
" Jeff Langan, Term Limits Group Says President Clinton Embraces
'Dramatic Change,' U.S. NEWSWIRE, INC., Jan. 20, 1993.
'Rob Mosbacher, supra note 3. By "limiting the length of time an individual

can serve in any one office is the most effective way of breaking the cycle of
political self-perpetuation. It would refocus most lawmakers on getting things
done rather than simply getting re-elected." Id.
Larry King Live: George F. Will on Restoring Deliberative Democracy
(CNN television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1992) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
6

SCRIPT file.
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limitations on its federal congressional delegation." It focuses on
the vexing constitutional issues of the original intent of the Framers
and its relation to the textual provisions of the Qualifications
Clauses8 and the Times, Places and Manner Clause. 9 This article

7 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII,

§ 9a.

1) In order to broaden the opportunities for public
service and to assure that members, of the United States
Congress from Colorado are representative and responsive to
Colorado citizens, no United States Senator from Colorado
shall serve more than two consecutive terms in the United
States Senate, and no United States Representative from
Colorado shall serve more than six consecutive terms in the
United States House of Representatives. This limitation on the
number of terms shall apply to terms of office beginning on or
after January 1, 1991. Any person appointed or elected to fill
a vacancy in the United States Congress and who serves at
least one half of a term of office shall be considered to have
served a term in that office for purposes of this subsection (1).
Terms are considered consecutive unless they are at least four
years apart.
2) The people of Colorado hereby state their support
for a nationwide limit of twelve consecutive years of service
in the United States Senate or House of Representatives and
instruct their public officials to work for such a limit.
3) The people of Colorado declare that the provisions
of this section shall be deemed severable from the remainder
of this measure and that their intention is that federal officials
elected from Colorado will continue voluntarily to observe the
wishes of the people as stated in this section in the event any
provision thereof is held invalid.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. "No person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. "No Person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years
a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant
of that State in which he shall be chosen."
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. "The Times, Places and Manner clause gives
each state legislature the power to regulate the manner of holding elections while
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does not address other constitutional issues, such as separation of
powers and aspects of federalism.' ° Nonetheless, focusing on
original intent and its relation to textual provisions sufficiently
justifies the validity of the Colorado Amendment. The Colorado
Amendment restricts United States Senators from serving more
than two consecutive terms and Representatives in the House from
serving more than six consecutive terms. However, members of
Congress who have served the maximum number of consecutive
terms may run again, once they have waited a four-year period.
The essence of the Colorado Amendment is to "broaden the
opportunities for public service and to assure that members of the
United States Congress from Colorado are representative of and
responsive to Colorado citizens." n
An examination of the goals of the Framers of the Constitution reveals that term limitations are consistent with their intent to
create a representative government. In light of this consistency, the
Colorado Amendment does not violate the Qualifications Clauses
of the Constitution. Furthermore, since the Colorado Amendment
does not amount to a qualification, an analysis under the Times,
Places and Manner Clause suggests that it is a valid state election
regulation.
II. THE FRAMERS' INTENT
Colorado's state-imposed term limitations strongly promote

reserving in Congress the power to alter such regulations except in the case of
Senators."
10 These issues pose less serious threats to the validity of the Colorado
Amendment than original intent and textual analysis. While some modem
scholars may view original intent as anachronistic, it remains an important
approach to Constitution adjudication. Charles Black notes that modem focus
solely on textual categories "forces us to blur the focus and talk evasively, while
the structural method frees us to talk sense." CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13 (Ox Bow Press, 1985). See
generally Stephen J.Safranek, Term Limitations:Do the Winds of Change Blow
Unconstitutional?,26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 321 (1993), for a recent discussion of

the separation of powers issue.
" COLO. CONST. art. XVIII,

§ 9a, cl. 1.
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the Framers'1 2 intent to create a stable representative government.1
In order to determine whether term limitations are
constitutional, it is necessary to understand the concerns of the
Framers during the post-independence era. Their primary concern
was to prevent an entrenched aristocratic legislature from usurping
power not duly delegated to that branch. Accordingly, the Framers
attempted to create structural safeguards sufficient to promote
effective representation and to avoid aristocratic tendencies.
However, they could not have foreseen the extent to which
Congress has become entrenched in Washington. 4 The Framers
also believed in republican government and feared a self-interested
legislature which could have the power to ensure its own perpetual
re-election. Because the Colorado Amendment promotes a
responsive and representative legislature, it is consistent with the
Framers' belief in republican government and directly addresses
their fear of long-term incumbency. While the Framers did
consider rotational schemes, a form of term limitations, they
instead chose to adopt other structural safeguards that they believed
would sufficiently achieve their goals.
A. Political Underpinnings of a Republican Government
One fundamental principle inherent in the Constitution is
the strong belief in a republican form of government. James
Madison defined such a system in Federalist No. 39:

For the purposes of this article, the term "Framers" denotes those persons
whose views were expressed during the debates over the form of American
Government during the colonial period and post-independence era and their
views, and not just the views of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention.
13 "Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important
one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government
with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form." THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
12

See generally TRUDY

PEARCE, TERM LIMITATION: THE RETURN

To A

CITIZEN LEGISLATURE (1991), reprintedin GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION 73

(The Free Press, 1992).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

We may define a republic to be . . a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior.
It is essential to such a government that it be

derived from the great body of the society, not from
an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it;
otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising
their oppression by a delegation of their powers,
might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim

for their government the honorable title of republic.
[emphasis in original] 5
Nevertheless, such a government was not intended to be a purely
popular government.16 Instead, the Framers envisioned that the
people would elect representatives holding similar beliefs to their
own, who would act on those beliefs, and promote the interests of
the nation. 17 The Framers, discontent with instability, factional15THE FEDERALIST

No. 39, at 241 (James Madison).

" Prior to the Constitutional Convention, many people believed in a pure
representative government, where the legislature "should be in miniature an exact
portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.",
reprinted in James C. Otteson, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of CongressionalTerm
Limits -- Improving Representative Legislation Under the Constitution, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). Also, numerous state constitutions attempted to
make legislators reflect the people. James C. Otteson at 8, nn. 34-39. However,
subsequent experience demonstrated the unworkable nature of such a system. "A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government;
but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions"; viz.,
some sort of check on tyranny of the majority. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322
(James Madison).
17The Framers were strongly influenced by the parochialism and factionalism
found under the Articles of Confederation. For example, Connecticut refused to
comply with requisitions of Congress. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF [hereinafter 'NOTES OF DEBATES"] 1787 224
(Norton, 1966); RICHARD BERNSTEIN, ARE WE To BE A NATION? 73-80
(Harvard University Press, 1987). The drafters at the Convention sought to avoid
these problems and many others. In opening the Constitutional Convention,
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ism, and lack of accountability under the Articles of Confederation,
attempted to create a legislature that was more responsive to its
constituents,1s yet institutionally independent of the "transient
impulse[s]" of the people.' 9 Furthermore, this notion of represen-

tation was based on the premise that the numerous views brought
before the legislature would be fully deliberated. 0
Term limitations provide the electorate with an effective

way to encourage new representatives with fresh views to run for
office.2 ' Term limitations also promote rational deliberation of
the constituents' demands.22 The goals. sought to be achieved by

Edmund Randolph alluded to what government ought to accomplish and
specifically delineated the defects of the Articles: "It does not provide against
foreign invasion ... it does not secure harmony to the states ... [it is] incapable

to produce certain blessings ... [the federal government] cannot defend itself
against encroachment ... [and it is] inferior to the states constitutions." 1787
DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 87 (Wilboume E. Benton ed., Texas A & M

University Press, 1986).
18

THE FEDERALIST,

supra note 13 at 226-27.

,9 "The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the
management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance
to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people
may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their
interests." TE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton); see generally
GEORGE F. WILL, supra note 14.
' Madison stated that the desire for representation of multiple views and
rational debate over those issues enables the majority to defeat the sinister views
of a controlling minority and conversely, allows the minority to be protected
from the majority because of the vast extent of views. THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 80-83.

While this distinction may seem imaginary, it is not. The Framers, as
noted, intended for people to be represented, not for the people to be represented
by a specific person. This point can be seen with greater clarity in later sections
of this article, particularly in reference to each state's ability to limit access to
the ballot.
2

2 See James C. Otteson supra note 16, at 10 ("one of the most fundamental
concepts associated with representation during this period was deliberation, by
which representatives arrived at legislative decisions through rational dialogue").
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term limitations are not contrary to the underlying goals of the
republican form of government. However, achieving representative
government was not the only force which motivated the Framers.
The fear of an aristocratic legislature also influenced the Framers'
goal of achieving a republican government.
B. Fear of an Aristocratic Legislature
One of the prominent reasons for creating a representative
government was the deep-seated fear of a self-perpetuating
aristocratic legislature. James Madison stated at the Constitutional
Convention:
If the legislature could regulate [the qualifications of
electors and elected], it can by degrees subvert the
Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an
aristocracy or oligarchy.23
This fear permeated the thoughts of both Federalists and antiFederalists during the ratification debates.24 The anti-Federalist
writer, Federal Farmer, observed that "the overriding concern of the
founder,...and the alert citizen, should be the danger of insidious
usurpation by the few,...and ever active aristocracy."25 The
possibility of legislative self-aggrandizement was not an imaginary
fear. History 26 and experience27 positively demonstrated the

2 2 THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 257 (J. Elliot

ed., 1836)[hereinafter "Elliot"].
2 The Federalists supported the new Constitution and were generally
advocates of a strong federal government while the anti-Federalists strongly
favored States' rights. However, these labels are not exclusive because most of
the Framers shared the same desires, they merely differed on how they were to
be implemented.
2

(1981).

HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 52

Storing delineates the anti-Federalist belief that even the new

Constitution still promoted aristocratic tendencies. Id. at Chapter 6.
26 On August 7, during the Constitutional Convention, Mr. Butler, a
Convention delegate, noted how the legislature in Holland abridged the right of
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ability of the legislature to usurp power that had not been delegated
to it.
The Framers' antipathy toward aristocratic tendencies is
articulated in the Constitution's prohibition against the granting of
any title of nobility by the United States. 2s Alexander Hamilton
asserted that the prohibition against titles of nobility is "the
cornerstone of republican government," 29 because without titles
of nobility, the tendency towards aristocracy diminishes. Longterm incumbency, particularly that experienced during the late
twentieth century, is analogous to the granting of titles of nobility
because long-term incumbency bestows special advantages based
on status.30 However, the Framers anticipated this and not only
prohibited the issuance of titles of nobility, but they also created a
structural3 system that safeguarded representation and promoted
stability.

Therefore,-term limitations are a means to address the

suffrage and stated that the Senate "fills up vacancies themselves, and form[s]
a rank aristocracy." NOTEs OF DEBATES, supra note 17, at 402. On August 10,
Madison noted that "the British Parliament possessed the power of regulating the
qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made
of it was a lesson worthy of ... attention." Id. at 428.
z' Many states believed that aristocratic tendencies were to be avoided and
therefore implemented term limitations for the state legislators. See PA. CONST.
OF 1776, art. II, § 8; see James C. Otteson, supra note 16 (prohibiting legislators
from serving more than four [one-year] terms in seven years in order to avoid
the danger of establishing an inconvenient aristocracy).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton).
28

30 See TRUDY PEARCE, supra note 14. The longest term in office for the
House of Representatives is Jamie Whitten's (D-MS) term of fifty plus years. In
fact, the analogy between long-term incumbency and the granting of titles of
nobility is demonstrated by the over 90% return rate of incumbents to Congress,
the effects of seniority and other 'perks.' The term -limitations movement, then,
is evidence of a desire to diminish the aristocratic tendencies of long-term
incumbency which have developed in the United States.
3, Madison illustrates this concern: "it cannot be feared that people of the
States will alter [their ability to elect representatives] in such a manner as to
abridge the rights secured to them by the federal constitution." THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison). However, Madison then discussed the
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modem-day version of titles of nobility.
The Framers also considered, but did not adopt, two
different types of rotational schemes. The first rotational scheme,
actually in place under the Articles of Confederation, was designed
to prevent excessive State power within Congress.32 This scheme
limited members of Congress to serving a total of three one-year
terms in office within any six-year period. 33 However, the system
of rotation under the Articles of Confederation was based on a
wholly different premise than that of the Colorado Amendment.
The Colorado initiative is not designed to limit the possible abuse
of state power, but rather to promote representation and deliberation. Therefore, the rejection of this rotational scheme based on
limiting the influence of states carries little weight because the
scheme rejected by the Framers is based on a different principle
than the Colorado Amendment.
The second type of rotational scheme paralleled modem
term limitations in its desire to promote representation and
responsiveness to the people. Because the Framers were aware of
this type of rotational scheme, opponents of term limitations argue
that the failure to include them in the Constitution is equivalent to

safeguards provided in the Constitution to ensure representation.
32 State legislatures elected, controlled, instructed and recalled their
representatives. Had any single state been able to keep one delegate in Congress
for any length of time, that state was likely to have greater influence or sway.
For a thorough discussion of the instruction problem, see James C. Otteson
supra note 16.
31 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V,

cl. 2.

" In fact, a rotational scheme to lessen the influence of the States is
embodied in Article I, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
which provides:
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of
the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be
into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class
shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second year, of the
second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the
third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one-third
may be chosen every second Year.
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a rejection of term limitations. 35 While this argument has merit,
exclusion of term limitations cannot be equated with outright
rejection of them by the Framers. The Framers believed that the
inclusion of term limitations was unnecessary because they had
provided a minimum framework in order to protect our republican
form of government. This framework consisted of a strong faith
in the virtue of the people, frequent elections and short terms in
office. The Framers believed that reliance on these factors was
sufficient. Therefore, the absence of term limitations in the
Constitution does not mandate a rejection of the Colorado Amendment.
Furthermore, during the ratification debates of the Constitution, many critics of the new Constitution expressed concern over
the absence of a rotational scheme. Thomas Jefferson noted that
a feature he strongly disliked was "the abandonment, in every
instant, of the principles of rotations." '3 Without such a scheme
it was feared that representatives would not be responsive to the
people. For example, one Framer feared that:
[legislators] will reside with their families, distant
from the observation of the people. In such situations, men are apt to forget their dependence, lose
their sympathy, and contract selfish habits .... The
senators will associate only with men of their own
class, and thus become strangers to the condition of
the common people. They should not only return,
and be obliged to live with the people, but return to
their former rank of citizenship, both to revive their
sense of dependence, and to gain a knowledge of
the country. 7

31

See

L. PAIGE WHITAKER, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATES LIMITING

92-19 A, AT 4 (Congressional Research, The Library of
Congress), (Jan. 2, 1992).
6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330 (H.A.
CONGRESSIONAL TERMS

Washington ed., 1853).
"

Elliot supra note 23, at 288 (speech of G. Livingston).
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Furthermore, many feared that corruption would flourish," and
that less people would run for office and take part in their civic
duties.3 9 However, proponents of the Constitution argued that the
safeguards built into the structure of the Constitution and their faith
in the people would allay these fears. 4°
Proponents of the Constitution pointed to frequent elections
and short terms of office and argued that the corresponding
provisions were included to prevent long-term incumbency, nobility
and corruption. Furthermore, the goal was to involve more people
with government and to rekindle the relationship between the
representatives and their constituents. In fact, Madison expressed
the same concerns as the anti-Federalists:
"It is essential to liberty that the government in
general should have a common interest with the
people, so it is particularly essential that the branch
of it under consideration should have an immediate
dependence and sympathy with, the people" [emphasis added]. 1

Under the Constitution "dependence" and "sympathy" flow from
3 Livingston, in proposing a term limitation amendment during the New
York ratification debates, alluded to the possibility of corruption resulting from
long-term incumbency and a failure to be familiar with the people. Referring to
a previous speaker, Livingston noted that "there should be no fear of corruption
of the members in the House of Representatives; especially as they are, in two
years, to return to the body of the people." Id. at 288. This statement implies that
the Framers believed that the electors would hold representatives accountable, but
longer terms would be detrimental to the people and be the seedling of
corruption. In fact, many modern commentators have discussed the possibility
for corruption; discussing why term limits ensure against corruption, George F.
Will noted that those new to the office -- "amateurs," do it for the love of it - not
some "contemptible motive." See Larry King Live, supra note 6.
'9Elliot supra note 23, at 310 (M. Smith noted that "if the office is to be
perpetually confined to a few, other men, of equal talents and virtue, but not
possessed of so extensive an influence, may be discourage from aspiring to it').
40THE FEDERALIST No.

57, at 350-53 (James Madison).

41THE FEDERALIST No.

52, at 327 (James Madison).
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the structural design of the Constitution, not rotational schemes.
Proponents of the Constitution believed that responsiveness to
constituents would result from the frequency of elections. They
also argued that accountability and representation were strongly
reinforced by the provisions for two-year terms of office and
frequent elections. 42 For example, the biennial election was a
compromise reached during the Convention that provided enough
travel time for representatives, while it kept them responsive to the
demands of the people. 43 The Framers had decreased the
possibility of corruption, encouraged citizen-participation in politics
and tightened the connection between the people and
representatives through other adequate means. Therefore, the
absence of a rotational scheme in the Constitution indicates that the
Framers' believed that it was unnecessary to include one.
C. Stability and Experience
The Framers also recognized that stability and experience
were essential to the proper functioning of government. As
Madison noted, "complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens...that our governments are too
unstable." " The Framers intended that a stable government, free
from usurpation by any one branch, would be achieved through
devices such as federalism, separation of powers and the bicameral
Legislature. In particular, the Legislature was divided into a lower
house (House of Representatives) and upper house (Senate) in order
to cushion the entire legislative branch from potential instability
within any one house. In fact, the Framers created a rotational
system where the lower house and one-third of the upper house
42

THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison).

43 NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 17, at 16870. In the debate of the oneyear or three-year terms, the main question was keeping legislators dependent on

the people while not letting them become too far removed. Id. at 106. However,
Hamilton felt that a three year term was a necessity because "there ought to be
neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments." Id. at
170.
44

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison).
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could be removed from office every two years through the election
process. The remaining two-thirds of the upper house provided
stability as the base of the legislature. Thus, even by imposing
term limitations upon legislators which would foster the more
frequent removal of legislators, the legislature remains stable
because two-thirds of the upper house remains unaffected by
changes resulting from elections.
Furthermore, the Framers valued representativeness and
responsiveness to the people over experience. The Framers
comprehended the importance of an experienced legislator,45 but
did not intend for experience to be the sole criterion for office.
While term limits will exclude some experienced legislators from
office, they prevent the entrenchment of legislators whose only
qualification is experience. The Colorado initiative also promotes
representation and responsiveness which are consistent with the
overriding policies of the Framers. If experience was the only
qualifying factor, once a Congressman was elected, his experience
alone would enable him to hold office, thereby creating a "nobility
of experience" detached from the citizenry. Madison concluded
that the two year term in office was a useful length of time because
it provided the legislator adequate time to acquire knowledge and
to be effective. 46
Colorado's Amendment does not preclude a legislator from
gaining experience, but rather provides the opportunity for more
citizens to enter government. In fact, after re-establishing their ties
to the community, legislators who are required to step aside for
four years will be able to return to Congress with experience and
a fresh understanding of their constituents' concerns. Therefore,
the focus should not be on whether term limits affect the level of
experience that a legislator has accumulated, but rather the
legislators' responsiveness to the people.
' Madison noted that "No man can be a competent legislator who does not
add to an upright intention and sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge
of the subjects on which he is to legislate." THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 322.
46 THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 332 (James Madison). Today, two years is
certainly not enough time in which a Representative can effectively address the
number of issues a Congressperson faces. Nonetheless, this rationale should not
be justification for allowing self-perpetuation of the legislature.
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III.

TERM LIMITATIONS: MANNER REGULATIONS OR
QUALIFICATIONS?

Colorado's state-imposed term limitation is a valid state
election regulation under the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
While term limitations are consistent with the Framers' intent,
Supreme Court case law requires further analysis of term limits
using a categorical approach towards election regulations. Case
law has drawn the distinction between "qualifications" and
"tmanner" regulations. A regulation which alters the qualifications
required to serve in office enumerated in the Constitution raises
serious constitutional questions and will likely be struck down. In
contrast, a regulation classified as a "manner" regulation will be
subject to a less stringent three-prong balancing test. The Constitution grants the states the authority to regulate the times, places and
manner of Congressional elections. 47 Therefore, it is necessary to
determine whether the Colorado initiative should be classified as
a manner regulation or an additional qualification. Once this
distinction is made, if the Colorado Amendment is found to be a
manner regulation, it is necessary to subject the amendment to
constitutional scrutiny as such a regulation.
A. The Oualifications Clauses
The Supreme Court has never defined the term "qualification." 4 The Constitution requires that candidates for Congress
meet three criteria in order to be elected to Congress. First, they
must be a resident of the state from which they are elected.
Second, they must be at least 25 years old for the House of
Representatives, and 30 years old for the Senate. Third, they must
be a U.S. citizen for seven years and nine years respectively. 49

47 U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

' Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A
Defense of the Constitutionalityof State-Imposed Term Limitations,20 HOF$TRA
L. REv. 341, 355 (1991).
4

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S.

CONST.

§ 3, cl. 3.
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Yet, nowhere in the Constitution are these requirements referred to
as qualifications. 5° James Madison, during the course of the
Constitutional Convention Debates, came close to defining the
qualifications of both voters and candidates as "'fundamental
articles in a Republican Govt. [sic] and ought to be fixed by the
Constitution.' 51 But Madison, in his broad characterization of
qualifications, failed to provide parameters which might illuminate
what the unifying principle is behind the qualifications enumerated
in the Constitution.
Qualifications have been defined by a Florida federal
district court as qualities which "must be possessed by the candidate; that is they are qualifications personal to him." 52 It appears

5 As the previous section of this article sets out, it seems that when the
Framers set out the qualifications, they intended that they should be fixed in
order to foster the ideals of a republican democratic government, such as
preventing the government from becoming entrenched in aristocracy.
The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental
articles in a Republican Gov[emment] and ought to be fixed by
the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an
aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable
of being elected, as the number authorized to elect .... It was
as improper to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own
privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction ag[ainst] another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the
stronger in order to keep out partisans of a weaker faction.
[NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 17, at 427]
Moreover, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969), the most
authoritative interpretation to date of the Qualifications Clauses, the Supreme
Court discusses the fixed quality of the Qualifications Clauses. It focuses on
whether members of Congress have the power to exclude its own members for
reasons beyond not meeting a qualification.
51
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at 533-34.
51 Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592, 594 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (requirement
of a filing fee to run in a U.S. Congressional election "is not an additional
*qualification to hold office but is simply a regulatory measure designed to insure
fair and orderly elections').
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from this definition that a term limitation is not a trait personal to
the individual, nor is it a characteristic that a prospective candidate
might possess. On the other hand, someone's age or status as an
American citizen are traits that are "personal" to that individual
because they are not severable from that person.53 While the term
"qualification" has never been clearly defined by a court, an
analysis of the cases which have interpreted the Qualifications
Clauses provides insight into its meaning.
B.

The Courts' Interpretations of the Qualifications
Clauses

The types of regulations that courts have considered to be
additional qualifications indicate that Colorado's state-imposed term
limitation should not be construed as an enumerated qualification.
The leading case interpreting the Qualifications Clauses, Powell v.
McCormack,5 ' emerged from the refusal. by Congress to seat
Adam Clayton Powell as a member of Congress in 1967. When
Powell was elected to the United States House of Representatives
for the 90th Congress,55 he met the standing requirements of age,
citizenship and residency. However, the House denied Powell his
seat based on a special subcommittee's report which found that
Powell, while acting as chair of the Committee on Education and
Labor, had deceived House authorities about certain travel expenses. The report also indicated that Powell arranged illegal salary
payments for his wife. When the 90th Congress met, the House
passed a resolution calling for Powell's exclusion and declaring his

s3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1241 (6th ed. 1990), defines a qualification as:

[t]he possession by an individual of the qualities, properties, or
circumstances, natural or adventitious, which are inherently or
legally necessary to render him eligible to fill an office or to
perform a public duty or function.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 486.
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seat vacant. 56 Powell challenged the validity of this resolution,
and the Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, held that the House
of Representatives did not have the power to exclude an individual
who meets all the requirements set forth in the Qualifications
Clauses from serving in Congress."7
In Powell, the Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the
historical background of the Qualifications Clauses. The Court
concluded that the Convention debates "manifest[ed] the Framers'
unequivocal intention to deny either branch of Congress the
authority to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifications
expressly set forth in the Constitution." 58 The Court further
noted that "the debates at the state conventions ... demonstrate the

Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of
Congress had been fixed in the Constitution." 59 Ultimately, the
Court held that "the House is without power to exclude any
member-elect who meets the Constitution's requirements for
membership." 6 Therefore, the House exceeded its authority by
attempting to add a qualification for Congress. The principle
which emerged from Powell is that the Qualifications Clauses are
absolute. Accordingly, the legislature does not have the authority
to add to or take away from the already existing qualifications for
candidacy for either the House or the Senate.
A number of lower federal and state courts have struck
down regulations which have attempted to add qualifications under
the Qualifications Clauses. In United States v. Richmond,1 the

court held that the terms of a U.S. Attorney's plea agreement
which required a Congressman to relinquish his seat, was unconstitutional. The plea bargain was interpreted as an attempt by the
56

Id. at 493.

57d.
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Id. at 532. (However, the Court indicated that it did not completely agree

with this conclusion, which was put forth by the petitioners, because the debates
are subject to other interpretations in other contexts).
59 Id. at 540.
6' Id. at 547.
6'

550 F. Supp. 605, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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government to add the qualification that a Congressman convicted
of a federal crime would be excluded from Congress. In addition,
other district courts6 2 have held restrictions unconstitutional
which require congressional candidates to live in the same district
in which they seek to be elected. Courts have determined that
these restrictions constitute additional qualifications since the
applicable Qualifications Clause 63 merely requires that candidates
for the House of Representatives live in the state in which they
seek to run. Colorado's term limitations are distinguishable from
the types of regulations which have been struck down as added
qualifications. State regulations that have been struck down for
attempting to narrow the state residency requirement for prospective members of Congress, in effect, add a qualification. Likewise,
a regulation which would attempt to raise or lower the minimum
age of a prospective candidate would also be struck, as would a
variation on the required number of years of citizenship. In
contrast, Colorado's provision limiting the number of consecutive
terms in which a member of Congress may serve, does not fall
within the three qualifications enumerated in the Constitution.
Therefore, term limitations cannot be characterized as additional
qualifications.
C. Times, Places and Manner Clause
The Colorado initiative is a valid exercise of a state's
authority to regulate the Times, Places, and Manner of congressio-

' Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1968)(statute struck down
which required a member of Congress to live in the district from which he was
nominated); Hellman v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 141 A.2d 908 (1958)(statute struck
down which required candidates to the U.S. House of Representatives to be
residents in the congressional district in which they seek election); see State ex.
rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968)(regulation was struck
down which required a state official to certify candidates' names to the county
clerks for offices to which they were nominated); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp.
729 (D. N.M. 1972)(election regulation which required a candidate to pay a
filing fee to be eligible to run for U.S. Senate was struck down); see also State
v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948).
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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nal elections. As with qualifications, the Supreme Court has never
explicitly defined which criteria determine whether a regulation
should be classified as a manner regulation.
However, the
Supreme Court has determined that attempts to label a state manner
regulation as a qualification are "wholly without merit" 64 and the
federal courts have consistently endorsed this view.' Once it is
established that the Colorado initiative is a manner regulation, it
should satisfy the three-part balancing test set forth by the Supreme
Court for assessing whether a manner regulation is constitutional.66
In determining whether the Colorado Amendment is a
proper manner regulation, it is necessary to compare it with other
state election regulations that have been upheld. In particular, a
California law which prohibited an independent-party candidate
from running in the general election was held to be a manner
regulation. Under that statute, candidates who had been registered
with an established political party within one year preceding the
election were ineligible to run for office on the independent
ticket.67 Further, in Texas, a statute prohibiting local officeholders from running for the federal legislature until their current office
terms were completed, was also found to be a valid manner
regulation.68 These ballot access provisions in California and
Texas are analogous to the Colorado Amendment in their impact
on the election process. Similar to ballot access regulations which
temporarily restrain a candidate from seeking office, the Colorado
Amendment requires a waiting period whereby legislators who have
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746, n.16 (1974).
65 Williams v. Tucker, 382 F. Supp. 381, 387 (M.D. Pa. 1974)(upholding a
statute requiring an independent candidate to obtain signatures within a certain
time frame, even if the statute has the effect of excluding those candidates
defeated in the primary from obtaining a position on a general election ballot);
Adams v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 502 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (upholding a statute requiring a state judge to resign from his office upon
becoming a candidate for U.S. Congress).
66Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
6' Storer, 415
6' Clements

U.S. at 728 (1974).

v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 971 (1982).
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held office for twelve consecutive years must wait four years
before seeking re-election. Accordingly, the Colorado initiative
should be classified as a manner regulation, and as thus, is subject
to constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for
determining whether a manner regulation is constitutional.' The
three factors considered by the Court are: (1) the character and
magnitude of the harm resulting from the state regulation, (2) the
state's interests promoted by the regulation and (3) the necessity of
the regulation in achieving those interests and whether they may be
arrived at by a less burdensome means. 70 If the Colorado initiative satisfies this test, it should be upheld as constitutional.
The character and magnitude of the harm caused by the
regulation should be reviewed by examining its impact upon First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Challengers to the Colorado
Amendment may argue that candidates' First Amendment rights to
associate and right to expression are thwarted by preventing them
from running for office for a four-year period. Likewise, under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, challengers
may contend that an unfair classification will be established by a
regulation that discriminates against twelve-year office holders,
who are precluded under the Colorado initiative, and not against
newcomers to the political process. Finally, voters themselves may
claim that their right to vote, as guaranteed under the Equal
Protection Clause, may be abridged by a state regulation that could
eliminate their candidate of choice.
The second factor requires identification of the state's
interests promoted by the Colorado Amendment. 7' The goals of
the Colorado provision, consistent with the Framers' intent, include
the promotion of representative democracy, strengthening the ties
between representatives and constituents and increasing interest and
participation in public service. 72

69 Atnderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
70 id.
71

Id.
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9(1).
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The third factor requires the court to measure the extent to
which the state interests make it necessary to burden First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 3 The Supreme Court has held that
a waiting period analogous to the waiting period required by
Colorado's Amendment "is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy ....This sort of insignificant interference with access to the ballot
need only rest on a rational predicate." 74 The Colorado Amendment merely requires a four-year waiting period after a candidate
serves 12 years in office. This burden is minimal when compared
to the strong interest the state has in encouraging legislators to be
responsive to their constituents. Therefore, the Colorado initiative
should be viewed as a reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation
because it is rationally related to the state interest. The Court
applied a similar analysis in upholding a Texas provision that
prohibited individuals who held certain public offices from running
for the legislature until their current office terms were completed.75 In addition, the Court has upheld a statute which prohibited
certain federal employees from running for political office.76 The
Colorado Amendment does not prevent an incumbent from
participating in the political process in general or in the campaign
of another candidate. Therefore, the amendment satisfies First
Amendment challenges because it is based on a rational predicate
and is less restrictive than previously upheld regulations.
In addition, the state's interest must be balanced against the
claim that term limitations unfairly discriminate against incumbents, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme
Court has held that an equal protection violation only exists when
there is an "invidious, arbitrary, or irrational" classification.77 In
fact, the Supreme Court has held that a regulation imposing a
waiting period does not result in such classification because there
7' Anderson,
71

460 U.S. at 789.

Clernents, 457 U.S. at 967-68.

75 id.
76

United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,

413 U.S. 548 (1973).
'n Clements, 457 U.S. at 967.
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is no discrimination based on the incumbent's political affiliation,
nor on his qualifications to hold public office.7 8 Since the Colorado initiative is based on a strong state interest, it does not result in
an invidious, arbitrary, or irrational classification, and thus is not
a violation of an incumbent's right under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that certain
burdens on a citizen's right to vote are reasonable and do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.79 For example, the Court
held that Hawaii did not need to demonstrate a compelling interest
in order to justify its ban on write-in voting. ° Likewise, a
rational relation test should also be applied to the Colorado
initiative's effect on the rights of voters, since it promotes the goal
of representation and imposes "only a limited burden on voters'
rights to make free choices and to associate politically through the
vote." 8"While term limitations may diminish a voter's choice of
candidates, this burden will "be light and normally will be
counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot
access scheme." 82 Accordingly, a claim brought by citizens
arguing that their right to vote is burdened under the Colorado
Amendment does not outweigh the state's interests. Therefore, the
Colorado initiative satisfies the Court's three-part balancing test
and is a valid manner regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether term limitations are viewed as a
qualification or a manner regulation, the Colorado initiative is
precisely what the Supreme Court has determined to be a valid
exercise of the state's power. Whether or not term limitations are
7

id.

7' Burdick v. Takushi, _ U.S. _,
at *23 (1992).
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the best means to address long-term incumbency, they are endorsed
by the fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution. The
Colorado initiative does not infringe on the fixed qualities set forth
in the Qualifications Clauses. In fact, a desire to eliminate longterm incumbency and promote representation weighs heavily in
favor of interpreting the Colorado Amendment to be a constitutionally valid manner regulation. Coupling the strong desire for
representative government with the broad powers of the states to
regulate elections under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
Colorado's Amendment is valid.

